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Abstract 
Corporate governance is the system by which organizations are directed, monitored and 
controlled. It is an oversight mechanism to ensure the management team efficiently allocates 
the organizational resources, so as to protect the interest of shareholders and stakeholders. 
There is a need for good corporate governance practice to stabilize the performance of 
financial institutions. This study investigated the influence of corporate governance in 
banking performance. Panel data analysis has been conducted for the top nine public and 
private commercial banks operating in Bangladesh for a period of 2009 to 2017. Board size, 
structure of internal audit committee and capital adequacy ratio were being taken as 
independent variables to measure the effects of corporate governance whereas return on asset, 
return on equity and earnings per share were being taken as dimensions for measuring bank 
performance. Correlation and regression analysis techniques were being used to examine the 
relationships between corporate governance practices and bank performance. The results 
indicated that CAR has the greater impact on Bank performance. The information derived 
from this study can be valuable and will help to enhance the understanding of the governing 
bodies of financial institutions for accelerating banking performance.  
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1. Introduction 
The banking sector plays an important role in the financial system of a country. Research on 
bank performance is very relevant given its central tendency in today’s economies. Corporate 
governance is the system by which banks are directed, monitored and controlled. Effective 
corporate governance in the financial institutes is a means of mobilizing the capital with the 
efficient utilization of the resources of the banks (Mayer, 1998). In other words, corporate 
governance promotes the efficient utilization of resources and the accountability of the 
resources utilized during the process (Cadbury, 2000). The Asian Development Bank (2000) 
considers the corporate governance as a bundle of instructions or mechanism which 
establishes the relationship amid the shareholders, administrators and management. The need 
for corporate governance arises from the conflict between the stakeholder and the company. 
The key objective of a corporation is to increase profit for its stakeholders whereas 
individuals serve for their own interest. And the job of governance is to align between the 
stakeholders and an individual. But, this job of corporate governance gets challenged when a 
financial crisis happens. During a financial crisis, instability can lead to a critical situation, as 
noted by Marinković & Radović (2014). The financial crisis has an effect on banks’ 
performance and can extend to other sectors. 
In Bangladesh, the market capitalization is 6.5% of GDP, as the investors have low 
confidence due to the weak corporate governance (Sobhan & Werner, 2003). Family 
businesses typically possess most of the private companies in Bangladesh. Therefore, there is 
an absence of an effective corporate governance system in financial institutes. Financing 
depends upon banks in Bangladesh rather than on the capital markets (Sobhan & Werner, 
2003).The controlled ownership by government and founding family members in the stock 
companies also causes set back to the corporate governance (Haque et al., 2011). The 
non-efficient markets and high concentration of ownership in the banking sector of 
Bangladesh leads to weak corporate governance (Temple, 2002).Recently, the banking sector 
of Bangladesh came under serious allegations where BDT 40 Billion credit default of 
Hallmark Group and BDT 2 Billion credit default of Bismillah Group were taken place by six 
commercial banks (Alam & Akhter, 2017). Such incidents proved the gap in good corporate 
governance practices in the banks. According to the World Bank (2003), the accounting rules 
and practices are not enforced in the Bangladesh banking sector. Hence, there is a critical 
need of study on banking performance influenced by corporate governance. Iannotta et al. 
(2007) performed an integrated analysis considering corporate governance, particularly 
ownership structure, risk and performance. In this study, the focus is on the corporate 
governance factors that are adopted by banks, measuring bank performance, and studying the 
influence of corporate governance on bank performance. The lack of studies of the effect on 
bank performance also justified this study’s relevance. In order to do so, the effects of board 
size, structure of internal audit committee and capital adequacy ratio has been considered. 
The evolution of banks’ governance after crisis years has also been considered.  
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Bank Performance 
Banks have an important role in the countries financial growth and they engage control over 
the supply of money in circulation for the fundamental improvements of monetary benefit. 
The banking sector gives a huge portion of the medium of exchange and is the essential 
instrument through which fiscal arrangement is led in terms of their deposit preparation and 
loaning tasks. Banks encourage the beneficial use of ideal money, hence helping society to 
create assets. The term “bank performance” signifies conveying into execution or 
accomplishment; or achievement of explicit exercises, or the execution of an endeavour of an 
obligation. Bank performance might be characterized as the impression of the manner by 
which the assets of a bank are utilized in a structure that empowers it to accomplish its 
destinations. Besides, the term bank performance implies the appropriation of a set of 
indicators which are demonstrative of the bank's present status and the degree of its capacity 
to accomplish the main objectives. Previous studies have mostly investigated the connection 
between corporate governance and bank performance by using Tobin’s Q or other market 
performance measures. But, in this study, the operating performances of Bangladeshi banks 
are focused. The fundamental reason is that market measures, i.e. stock costs and market 
capitalizations are not accessible for the investigated banks. Additionally, capital market of 
Bangladesh is not productive and stable. Therefore, market-based data may not precisely 
correspond to the performance of Bangladeshi banks. As supported by Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008), stock returns are not in every case fundamentally connected with governance, 
regardless of whether there is a noteworthy relationship among corporate governance and 
bank performance. In addition, the expanded multifaceted nature of financial institute 
requires thinking about the particular drivers of banking performance regarding income and 
efficiencies. Previous studies used return on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and 
earnings per share (EPS) as the measures of firm’s performance (Brick et al., 2006; Cheng, 
2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Brown and Caylor, 2006; Klein, 1998; Lo, 2003). ROA 
indicates the actual performance of a firm (Ponnu, 2008). ROE is another predictor for 
performance measure and appropriate both inshort-term and long-term benefits for most 
shareholders (Johnson & Greening, 1999; Brealey & Myers, 2000). It demonstrates a 
financial saver about how much benefit can be formed by the firm, utilizing the cash 
contributed from its investors (Epps & Cereola, 2008). EPS sanction the partners to realize 
overall increase earned on per share basis which decides benefit (Weygandt et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in this study, the investigation utilizes ROA, ROE and EPS to determine 
performance of banks. 
2.2 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance can be market based or the bank centred relationship based. In the 
market based corporate governance, financing is provided by the investors while in the bank 
cantered corporate governance, financing comprises of a large portion of debt as well as 
equity (Prowse, 1996). Macey and Miller (1995) defined Corporate Governance as the 
regulations that give rights to the stockholders, members of the board and executives in 
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management of the companies and financial institutions. Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) defined 
Corporate Governance as regulations comprising of rules, procedures and values that are 
implemented by shareholders, executive directors and the top management of the companies 
in performing tasks, transactions and functioning. As stated by Uddin (2005), lack of 
professional ethics by the governing bodies and ineffective policy implementation leads to 
poor corporate governance. On the other side, good corporate governance will in general 
guarantee sound corporate performance by giving assurance to investor’s premium (OECD, 
2004). Monetary pros and banks will be progressively anxious to place their money in firms 
with incredible administration since they will go up against lower costs of capital, which is 
another reason for better firm execution (Coombes & Watson 2000). Various partners, 
including agents and suppliers, will likewise should be connected with and start a new 
business organization with so much firms, as the associations are most likely going to be 
progressively prosperous, increasingly alluring, and reliable than those with firms with less 
reasonable administration. 
2.3 Banking Sector of Bangladesh 
In Bangladesh, there are few professional bodies that carry out audit in companies according 
to the Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS). There are 57 scheduled banks and 6 
non-scheduled banks in Bangladesh that operate under the Central Bank, called Bangladesh 
Bank. According to Kamal et al. (2007), the banking sector acts as a main monetary 
intermediary in the economic activities of Bangladesh because of the weak capital markets, 
inadequate accessibility of financial tools as well as the absence of the self-confidence in the 
economic system of Bangladesh. A bank also plays an intermediary role to provide constancy 
to monetary organizations. Bangladesh as a country like several other developing nations 
have implemented policies for developing and restructuring the banking sector. A significant 
characteristic of these policies is the designing of regulations, rules and practices that can 
govern and monitor the transactions going on in the banking sector. These practices are 
known as corporate governance of the banks. The bank centred corporate governance is 
suited for Bangladesh as the financial markets are mostly undeveloped emerging markets 
(Arun & Turner, 2004). So, banks are the major source of finance in the economy. According 
to Moudud (2015), the Conventional-Banks and the Shariah Banks are using corporate 
governance guidelines and regulations, as both the banking sectors are facing significant 
improvement in their functioning. As compared to the Conventional Banks, the Shariah based 
Banks have lacking in following the Corporate Governance applies (Moudud, 2015). The 
Corporate Social responsibility in the banking sector of Bangladesh focuses on the initiatives 
that are taken in order to assist two vital sectors within the economy of Bangladesh, that is, 
the agriculture sector and the Small Medium Enterprise sector (Wise & Ali, 2009).  
2.4 Financial Crisis 
Strong Corporate Governance will enhance the efficiency of the economy in Bangladesh. The 
Bangladesh banking sector would become competitive if good Corporate Governance would 
be implemented in financial institutions. For attracting foreign investment, there is a need that 
Bangladesh should improve its corporate governance system. Followings are the cases of 
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major corporate collapses that occurred throughout the world: The first ever-recorded case in 
the history of the banking sector was that of the Medici Bank in 1494 in Italy (Raymond, 
1948). The bank ended up in large debts due to the inability of the bank to control lavish 
spending of the directors and managers. As a result, the bank underwent bankruptcy. In 1983, 
the Carrian Group, a Hong Kong conglomerate, which was the largest in the history of Hong 
Kong has been collapsed. This group owned real estate business and other businesses such as 
insurance, hotels, transport, taxi, and so on (Cromie, 1986). It occurred due to an accounting 
fraud. In this case, an auditor was murdered, and an advisor committed suicide. In 1987, the 
American oil subsidiary Chevron Corporation, Texaco Inc. went into bankruptcy after 
undergoing a legal battle with the Pennzoil (Tierney, 2007). It owed a debt of $10.5 billion. 
Later, Chevron Corporation resurrected and took over the company. In 2009, after the 
financial crisis of 2007 to 2008, the government of Ireland forced the Anglo-Irish bank to be 
nationalized. The total loans granted to the directors were higher than €255 million (Carolan, 
2009). The private investors sued the bank for $23 million. In 2001, Enron scandal emerged 
as a result of the corruption in the Enron Corporation, which is an American energy, 
commodities and services-based corporation (Gore & Murthy, 2011). This scandal questioned 
the accounting rules and practices on several corporations in the United Sates. Hallmark is 
the largest banking deception in Bangladesh's banking sector. It occurred to the weak 
Corporate Governance system in the banking industry of Bangladesh. The Sonali Bank of 
Bangladesh was involved in giving a loan of USD 318 million to the Hallmark group (Joseph, 
2016). The fraud was detected in 2012 and the top management of the Sonali Bank was found 
to be involved in the corruption. Proper implementation of corporate governance rules and 
regulations would have prevented the above cases of fraud and corruption. Hence, this shows 
that there is a dire need that companies and banks should strictly implement the corporate 
governance rules and regulations in order to comply with the international standards. This 
will prevent cases of fraud and will also attract foreign investors. 
2.5 Relationship Between Corporate Governance and Bank Performance 
Previous studies have stated that practicing good corporate governance helps to improve 
organizational performance under steady economic conditions and protects against the 
adverse effects of financial crises and turbulence (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; 
Gupta et al., 2013; Jackowicz & Kowalewski, 2012). In this study, the following corporate 
governance dimensions are used: board size, structure of audit committee and capital 
adequacy standard ratio. The size of the board indicates the number of administrators in the 
panel. There are various remarks about the size of the 'perfect' board. A perfect board ought to 
participate with individuals who are official and not official (Ghosh, 2003) 8 to 9 people 
ought to be ready (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) while Leblanc and Gillies (2003) likewise 
expressed that size of board should be between 8 to 11 individuals. BEI (2004) rules show 
that internationally successful corporate sheets have relationship of seven to fifteen chiefs. As 
indicated by BSEC (2012), the size of the Board Members of the organizations should be 
between 5 and 20. Viable board size ought to be included different skill and investment to 
give a well-shaped board. An excessive number of individuals in the top managerial staff 
might be wasteful because of futile correspondence that causes the chiefs' free riding issue. 
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Instead of number, viability of a board ought to be the most extreme thought. Participation of 
free chiefs empowers the board to take fair-minded and fair-minded choice. The BSEC (2012) 
stipulates that in any event one fifth of the all-out number of executives of the Board of 
Directors ought to be free. Consequently, supervisors will be increasingly autonomous to take 
the choice which will expand the imagination of administrators (Gande et al., 2008). The 
Audit Committee (AC) examinations internal money related activities, grows the exemplary 
nature of budgetary reports, and indorses a choice of outside evaluators and checking the 
inspectors qualities and objectivity just as review productivity which causes an organization 
to accomplish its aspirations in a powerful and efficient manner (Subramaniam et al., 2013). 
The fundamental objective of setting up an Audit advisory group is to keep up the uprightness 
of monetary reports by reflecting money related material of organizations and present a valid 
just as reasonable view (Ojo, 2006). Inward review underpins organization and the executives 
in the gainful after-effect of their duty (Lorsch & Young, 1990). Review advisory group helps 
the leading group of the executives, organization, inner-review and outside-review, a ton to 
take the significant choice about firm. One of the most significant markers of good 
administration practice is the capital sufficiency proportion (least legitimate necessity) that 
exhibits the long-haul endurance limit of the undertaking. It additionally diminishes the 
probability of insolvency of banks (Yudistira, 2003). It is utilized to secure contributors and 
to improve the dependability and productivity of monetary frameworks on the planet. So as to 
ingest the misfortunes and monetary inadequacies of the Bank, the Bank may give the Bank's 
capital sufficiency and give insurance and affirmation to contributors and loan bosses. Great 
corporate administration will in general give solid corporate execution by giving security to 
the interests of investors (OECD, 2004). Stockholders and lenders will be more enthusiastic 
to invest on companies with decent governance because they will confront less capital costs, 
which are a better firm performance source (Coombes & Watson, 2000). Additional 
shareholders, as well as personnel and sellers, will want to engage in business relationships 
and involve in relationships with such firms because their relationships are more prosperous, 
more equitable and more durable than companies with less effective governance. 
2.6 Research Framework 
Based on the literature review, the following conceptual framework has been developed in 
Figure 1 to guide this research. 
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Figure 1. Research framework 
 
3. Methods 
In this study, the proposed conceptual framework adapted from agency theory. The basic 
concept of agency theory was first established by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and then 
reviewed by Eisenhardt (1989) to introduce the concept, context, and principles of the theory. 
This theory presents a model to analyse the relationships between variables for identifying 
the problem that exists between parties and methods to solve it (Eisenhardt, 1989). In this 
study, the agency relationship occurs when the principal party (the banks) depends on the 
other party (the agent) to perform certain actions on behalf of the client.  
The current research comprises of quantitative research methodology. The quantitative 
research includes secondary sources of data collection. The secondary source includes review 
of literature from books, articles, journals and data from the authentic websites of Bangladesh 
bank, Dhaka Stock Exchange and Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Bank’s annual report. The target population for this study was all banks working in 
Bangladesh. Panel data analysis technique has been employed for the investigation (Zakaria 
et al., 2014). The time considered for this paper is 9 years from 2009 to 2017. This period is 
soon after the budgetary emergency of 2008–09, which critically affected monetary 
organizations (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Gorton & Metrick, 2012). Among the populace nine 
banks are taken as a sample to break down the effect of corporate governance on bank 
performance. These nine sample banks are Sonali Bank, Agrani Bank, Pubali Bank, Rupali 
Bank, Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited, Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited, Prime Bank Limited, 
Dhaka Bank Limited, and BRAC Bank Limited. The yearly reports of these banks are 
investigated by downloading from the official sites of the respective banks. The reason for 
choosing the yearly reports is that the yearly report is the most widely recognized document 
normally created by organizations in Bangladesh. Annual reports are considered as the main 
way of communicating information about the company (Belal, 2000; Khan et al., 2009). 
From the dataset, to quantify the effect of corporate governance on bank performance, three 
models has been produced where ROA, ROE and EPS are taken as measurements for bank 
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performance (dependent variable) and size of the Board of the individual banks (BDS), size 
of the audit committee (AC) and capital adequacy ratio (CAR) are taken as independent 
variables. In this investigation three regression models has been taken to decide the effect of 
the corporate governance on bank performance. Here β is the constant and ε is the error.  
 
    	
       …………………………………………… (1) 
    	
       …………………………………………… (2) 
    	
        …………………………………………… (3) 
 
Statistical analysis tool was utilized to assess and inspect the information to gauge the 
connection between corporate administration and bank execution. This examination has 
utilized two techniques for investigation, to be correlation and regression investigation, to 
analyze the connection among dependent and independent variables. Finally, some 
managerial implications are recommended at the end based on panel data regression analysis 
results. 
4. Analysis and Results 
Generalized least squares estimator with Durbin-Watson residual test has been considered 
during the linear regression analysis to correct the standard errors for possible autocorrelation. 
The correlation coefficients give explanation of the strength of the relationship and the course 
of the relationship (can be positive or negative) with two continuous variables. It’s range 
from -1 to +1 and -1 indicates strong negative correlation while +1 indicates strong positive 
correlation. So, the closer the coefficient of these numbers represents the strong correlation of 
the data. This scale indicates no correlation at 0, so the value closest to zero emphasizes a 
weaker correlation than those close to +1 / -1. Bank Performance is calculated by three 
dependent variables; Return on Asset (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings per share 
(EPS).  
From Table 1, it is found that Board Size (BDS) has the negative relationship with ROA 
(-0.007) and the p-value is 0.954 which is more than 0.05. Therefore, it indicates that there is 
no relationship between BDS and ROA. On the other hand, the correlation coefficient BDS 
with ROE and EPS is 0.001 and 0.002 respectively and significance level of p=0.995 and 
p=0.986 which is more than 0.05. It indicates that BDS has the positive but very weak 
relationship with ROA and ROE. According to the correlation test, BDS does not affect that 
much on the Bank performance. The correlation coefficient of Audit Committee (AC) and 
ROA is 0.020 and the p-value is 0.862 which is more than 0.05, this means there is a weak 
positive relation between AC and ROA. In contrast, the correlation coefficient of AC with 
ROE and EPS is -0.117 and -0.103 and p-value is 0.300 and 0.359 respectively which is not 
significant. It means the number of members of Audit Committee (AC) is inversely 
proportional to banks’ ROE and EPS. The positive values of correlation coefficient of Capital 
Adequacy Ratio(CAR) with ROA (0.501) and with ROE (0.679) and with EPS (0.641) 
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indicates that there is a moderate positive relationship exist between CAR and Bank 
performance (calculated by ROA, ROE and EPS) and the p value is (0.000, 0.000, 0.000 
respectively). It indicates that CAR affects the Bank performance. 
 









Correlation Coefficient -0.007 0.001 0.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.954 0.995 0.986 
Audit Committee 
Correlation Coefficient 0.020 -0.117 -0.103 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.862 0.300 0.359 
Capital Adequacy 
Ratio 
Correlation Coefficient 0.501 0.679 0.641 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
 
In Table 2, the results are from the multiple regression Model 1. These results are based on 
dependent variable ROA. It can be seen from the results of regression analysis that the 
dependent variable describes the illustrative variables in the model with R2=26.7% and 
Adjusted R2=23.9% which indicates the independent variables simplify 26.7% of volatility of 
the dependent variable. The result of F is 9.537 also significant with the p-value=0.000, 
which indicates that corporate governance does not sufficient effect on ROA and regresses in 
the model have described variations appropriately in the dependent variable. Therefore, ROA 
has positive and significant relationship with capital adequacy ratio, but there is no relation 
with audit committee and board size.  
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -1.362 0.623 
 
-2.185 0.032 
Board Size -0.02 0.023 -0.091 -0.861 0.392 
Audit Committee 0.13 0.105 0.132 1.234 0.221 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 0.179 0.034 0.527 5.292 0.000 
R=0.517, R2= 0.267, Adjusted R2= 0.239, Anova, sig=0.000 and F=9.357 
 
In Table 3, dependent variable is ROE for Model 2. It can be seen from the results of 
regression analysis that the dependent variable describes the illustrative variables in the 
model with R2=46.4% and Adjusted R2=44.3% which indicates the independent variables 
simplify 46.4% of unpredictability of the dependent variables. The result of F is 9.537 also 
significant with the p-value=0.000. This specifies that, in general, the model can significantly 
forecast the dependent variable and corporate governance does not have that much influence 
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on ROE. The results also show that there is a positive relationship between ROE and capital 
adequacy ratio and other variables do not have any relation with ROE. 
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -72.492 17.839 
 
-4.064 0.000 
Board Size -0.36 0.658 -0.049 -0.547 0.586 
Audit Committee 0.125 3.004 0.004 0.042 0.967 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 7.769 0.968 0.683 8.023 0.000 
R=0.681, R2= 0.464, Adjusted R2= 0.443, Anova, sig=0.000, F=22.2 
 
In Table 4, dependent variable is CAR for Model 3. It can be seen from the results of 
regression analysis that the dependent variable describes the illustrative variables in the 
model with R2=41.3% and Adjusted R2=39% which indicates the independent variables 
simplify 41.3% of unpredictability of the dependent variables. The result of F is 18.046 also 
significant with the p-value=0.000. This specifies that, in general, the model can significantly 
forecast the dependent variable. The results from the Table 4 also shows that EPS has the 
positive relation with the capital adequacy ratio and again EPS has no relationship with Board 
size and audit committee.  
 





Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -103.218 24.909 
 
-4.144 0.000 
Board Size -0.453 0.919 -0.047 -0.493 0.624 
Audit Committee 0.462 4.195 0.011 0.110 0.913 
Capital Adequacy Ratio 9.798 1.352 0.646 7.246 0.000 
R=0.643, R2=0.413, Adjusted R2=0.390, Anova, sig=0.000, F=18.046 
 
5. Discussion 
Based on the corporate governance practices of the nine of the largest banks of Bangladesh 
and using 81 observations for the time period of 2009-2017, this study investigated the    
relationship between corporate governance and Bank performance. According to the 
regression analysis, it is clear that board size of Banks has no relationship with ROA, ROE 
and EPS. Therefore, the association between BDS and bank performance is questionable. 
Consequently, bank should emphasize on the productive and efficient directors than the size 
of the Board. The results from the regression also demonstrate that there is no relationship 
between the number of account committee members and the bank performance. The 
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proficiency of auditor can carry out more in real deception uncovering than size of the 
committee. In addition to the professional skills, AC members should be self-governing 
equally to the employees and operative sector. The total number of independently working 
directors in the board and the total number of individual members in the audit committee 
need to be balanced. Their competency and effectiveness need to be the ultimate 
consideration rather than focusing on their numbers. The findings from the regression imply 
that, capital adequacy ratio has the positive and significant relation with ROA, ROE, and EPS. 
That means the CAR has the greater impact on Bank performance. So, it can be concluded 
that all banks should maintain their capital adequacy ratio which will attract clients and 
reduce the chances of becoming insolvent as well as will increase the performance of the 
bank. Banks can set their own policies regarding capital adequacy ratio based on the expected 
safety level. 
Directors are accountable for the management of their companies. Shareholders can actively 
participate in establishing good governance practices to hold performance of the banks 
parallel to central bank. The role of stakeholders in governance is to determine that there is an 
appropriate board of directors, managers and auditors are being employed. It gains the 
confidence of the local as well as foreign investors as they feel satisfied that their investment 
is in safe hands. Good corporate governance also ensures the implementation of the legal 
compliance and unbiased decisions for the benefit of the companies. Good corporate 
governance gives the impression to the investors that the financial institutions are stabilized, 
and it is safe to invest in them even during financial crisis.  
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
In Bangladesh, the corporate governance in Banks & financial institutions is highly linked 
with the performance of the companies. This study will help the Banks and other financial 
institutions about following good corporate governance practices. A failure of governance in 
banking and financial institutions is one of the causes of bankruptcy by reputed companies. 
This is because organizations require funds either from banking channel or capital market. So, 
in order to pursue the target and short-term profit maximization set by the Board, banks and 
financial institutions engaged in malpractices and results in loan default, bankruptcy, and 
finally financial collapse. The Capital Market of Bangladesh is still in an emerging stage with 
market capitalization of amounting 6.5% GDP. Most importantly, the country achieved such 
growth within many constraints like political hurdles, import dependency and infrastructure 
bottlenecks. The size of the economy (GDP) has been tripled to USD 221.4 billion 
(FY2016-17) in the last decade, while the service sector, especially the banking sector made 
visible contribution both directly and indirectly in real sector growth.  
There were some limitations in this study. Firstly, this study conducted only on the banking 
sector of Bangladesh. So, further research can be conducted on other financial institutions 
like, insurance companies, NGO, pension funds and so on. Secondly, this study focuses on 
the time period after the financial crises of 2007-2008. Therefore, further study can be the 
comparison of the before and after financial crisis. Finally, this study has taken three 
variables – size of the board, size of the audit committee and capital adequacy ratio to 
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conclude the performance of the banks in the course of return on asset, return on equity and 
earnings per share. There are still many variables like, the structure of ownership, loan loss 
ratio, P/E ratio, and risk variables which can be used to investigate the relation between 
corporate governance and Bank performance. 
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